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REPLY BRIEF
II.

INTRODUCTION

Both the County and the Highway District have relinquished all claims and
defenses raised below, except for the claim that there was a common law dedication of
the right-of-way through the Paddison property.
As to the common law dedication issue, historically, there are two kinds of a
dedication in Idaho, statutory and common law.

Both require acceptance of the

dedication: statutory dedication requires following certain statutory procedures; common
law dedication requires something short of the statutory formalities for acceptance but
still requires an unequivocal act by proper public officials to assume jurisdiction over the
property dedicated.

Such unequivocal act includes annexation, a resolution, or

maintenance by the county or highway district.
In this case, no such act has ever occurred and instead, both the County and the
Highway District both refuse jurisdiction over the road and deny an interest in it.

III.

ll\llPORTANT FACTS.

The Right-of-Way Deed was granted to the Secretary of Agriculture for Fifty
Dollars ($50.00). (R., 22-25. 27-30, 34). The right-of-way is part of what is referred to
as Forest Road 317. (R., R., 4, 62). The Forest Service is the only entity that has ever
done any maintenance on the road. (R., 104, 130, 183). 1 The Forest Service controls
access to the road by a gate which is closed for seven to nine months per year. (R., 130,
147). The Paddisons have their own gate at the same location and have been told by the
Forest Service that they can close it, and Richard Paddison does so at his discretion. (Id.)

1

The sporadic maintenance alleged to have been done by the Forest Service is set forth in Appellant's Brief
at p. 5.

[ l]

Based on the evidence presented by Terry Agee of the Highway District, public
use of the right-of-way didn't begin until about 30 years ago, which would be 1980. (R.,
103, 104). Prior to then, virtually the only use of the right-of-way was via horse by the
person staffing the fire lookout. (R., 130-131). In about 2000, the use of the road by
A TVs increased dramatically. (Id.)
Both the County and the Highway District disclaim jurisdiction over the right-ofway. (Highway District's Brief, p. 4, 1. 10; County's Brief, p. 3, 1. 7 and 1. 14.) Both the
County and the Highway District consider the Coolwater Ridge Road, of which the rightof-way is a part, to be a Forest Service road. (R., 104 at <f[8; County's Brief, p. 3, 1. 15).
The Highway District states that it has no interest in it. (R., 87, 104). It has no record
accepting the dedication of the right-of-way.

(R., 87, 104, 150)

It has not laid out,

altered, or opened the right-of-way as a highway. (Id.) The District has never included
the right-of-way on its official map. (Id.) It has never performed work, construction,
maintenance or repair of the right-of-way or kept it up at its expense. (Id.)
All of the preceding has been admitted by the County as well. (R., 12. 13, 15, 62,
63, 83).
In short, both the Highway District and the County admit that there has been no
"positive conduct" or any unequivocal act by either entity to accept the dedication and
assume jurisdiction over the right-of-way.

IV.
A.

ARGUMENT

THE HIGHWAY DISTRICT Acl\1D COUNTY ARE ARGUING FOR A
TYPE OF PUBLIC ROAD THAT DOES NOT EXIST UNDER IDAHO
LAW.

[2]

Before discussing all the case law cited by the Highway District, the Court should
focus on what government body, if any, would assume jurisdiction of the right-of-way.
The Highway District argues that: "[t]he offer of common law dedication may be
accepted by individual members of the public rather than a specific local road agency."
Highway District Brief: p. 15. There is no case law supporting this proposition.
For a common law dedication to be valid, some public agency must accept the
dedication. Contrary to the Highway District's assertion, Stafford v. Klosterman, 134
Idaho 205, 998 P.2d 1118 (2000), is very applicable to this case and did involve a claim
of common law dedication. The Court held that because the Minidoka Highway District
refused to assume jurisdiction over the road, a public road was not created. Id. 134 Idaho
at 208.
In 1978, Klosterman had platted subdivision lots, recorded the plat, and sold the
subdivided lots with reference to the plat.

However, the Minidoka County Highway

District would not endorse its acceptance on the plat and would not assume responsibility
for the roads depicted on the plat.

Therefore, the case did not involve a statutory

dedication because the plat did not meet the requirements for a statutory dedication.
Instead, relying on Worley Highway Dist. v. Yacht Club, 116 Idaho 219, 775 P.2d
111 ( 1989), Klosterman argued that a valid common law dedication was effected when he
platted the lots and sold them based on the plat. His argument was that he had dedicated
the road, sold the lots, and the facts were that he and the owners in the subdivision used
the road. The Court rejected Klosterman's argument that a common law dedication was
effected.

[3]

In doing so, the Court distinguished Klosterman' s case from Worley because in
Worley:

The highway district was asserting a claim to the roadway which would
require maintenance of the roadway at public expense. In this case the
Minidoka Highway District does not claim any interest in the roadways.
and the litigants agree there is no public responsibility for maintenance of
the roads.
Stafford v. Klosterman, 134 Idaho at 208.

In this case, just like in Stafford, both the Highway District and the County have
disclaimed any interest in and refused responsibility for the right-of-way.
The Stafford Court also questioned the continuing viability of common law
dedication and put to rest the possibility that there can be a common law dedication
without some act which unequivocally shows an intent to assume jurisdiction over the
property dedicated. Pullin v. Victor, 103 Idaho 879, 881, 655 P.2d 86 (Ct.App. 1982).
The Stafford Court stated:
Even if the cases related to dedication by the common law method have
continuing viability, they do not aid Klosterman, because he does not
claim Peck Road or the sixty-foot easement to be public roads as that
concept is recognized in Idaho law. He claims a form of public road
casement which involves no public responsibility.
Id. 134 Idaho at 208. (Emphasis added).

Likewise, in this case, neither the County nor the Highway District want
jurisdiction over, responsibility for, or maintenance of the road, yet they both argue that
this Court should mle it is a public road under the laws of the state of Idaho. Like the
plaintiff in Stafford, both entities are arguing for a form of public road under Idaho law
which does not exist.

[4]

This Court should rule that given the refusal of the County and the Highway
District to claim an interest in or assume jurisdiction over the road in this case, it is not a
public road under the laws of the state of Idaho, whether by common law dedication or
otherwise.
Otherwise, a mling in favor of the Highway District or the County would allow a
property owner to dedicate a road by deed. allow people to use the road. and thereby
create a public road even in the presence of the refusal by a county or city or highway
district to claim any interest or assume jurisdiction over the road. This is not a means by
which a public road can be created in Idaho.

B.

THE FACTS OF THE CASES CITED BY THE HIGH\VA Y DISTRICT
AND COUNTY ALL INVOLVE EITHER THE SALE OF LOTS \VITH
REFERENCE TO A RECORDED PLAT OR SOl\tIE ACTION \VHICH
UNEQUIVOCALLY
SHO\VED
THE
INTENT
TO
ASSUME
JURISDICTION OVER THE PROPERTY DEDICATED.
To prove a common law dedication in Idaho, one must prove that the dedication

was accepted by "positive conduct evincing consent of proper public officers on behalf of
the public. Pullin v. Victor, 103 Idaho 879, 881, 655 P.2d 86, 88 (Ct.App. 1982.) The
dedication is complete when there is some act which unequivocally shows an intent to
assume jurisdiction over the property dedicated. Id. Annexation has been held to be one
such unequivocal act. Id. 103 Idaho at 884, 655 P.2d 91; Thiessen v. City of Lewiston,
26 Idaho 505, 510, 144 P. 548 (1914).
The Highway District cites to cases it claims proves a common law dedication
was completed in this case. 2 However, not one of the cases stands for the argument made
by the Highway District. Every case cited involved either the platting of property into

2
The County only cites Thiessen and does not cite any other cases. Instead, it simply concurs in the
Highway District's arguments.

[5]

lots and the sale of the lots with respect thereto, or some other positive act showing
acceptance and assumption of jurisdiction by the particular city, county, or highway
district over the road.
The first case cited is Boise City v. Hon, 14 Idaho 272, 94 P. 167 (1908).
However, that case involves the discrete aspect of common law dedication that applies
where property has been subdivided into lots, the plat lays out roads and streets, and the
lots have been thereafter sold. In such case, the dedication is complete upon the sale of
lots. See e.g., Saddlehorn Ranch Landowner's v. Dyer, 146 Idaho 747, 203 P.3d 677
(2009); Ponderosa Homesite v. Garfield, 143 Idaho 407, 146 P.3d 673 (2006); Armand v.
Opportunity Afanagement Co., Inc., 141 Idaho 709, 117 P.3d 123 (2005); West Wood
Investments, Inc. v. Acord, 141 Idaho 75, 106 P.3d 401 (2005).

No such facts exist in this case.
r-.foreover, in Boise City v. Hon, after the subdivision was platted, it was annexed
by the Boise City, which the Court held was "implied acceptance" on the part of the city.
In response to the contention that there had been no acceptance by the city, the Court
stated:
Prior to 1893, we had no statute on the subject of laying out city and
village lots and blocks, streets and alleys, filing plats thereof, and
dedicating streets and alleys to public use. It is the contention of counsel
for respondent that there was no acceptance of this dedication by Boise
City or the public. We cannot concur with that contention. Arnold's
Addition was platted and laid out as an addition to Boise City, and
lots and blocks were sold therein with reference to such plat, and the
act of the legislature extending the corporate limits of Boise City so as
to include said addition was clearly an implied acceptance thereof by
the city. However, regardless of that fact, we think the dedication was
complete when Arnold platted said land and filed a plat for record
and sold lots with reference to said plat.
Id. 14 Idaho at 277. (Emphasis added).

[6)

Thus, under Boise City v. Hon, there are two situations where acceptance is
implied: (1) where there is a sale of platted lots in reference to the plat; and (2) where the
subdivision is annexed.
The next case cited by the Highway District is Thiessen v. City of Lewiston, 26
Idaho 505, 144 P. 548 (1914). Paddison already discussed Thiessen in its Opening Brief
and incorporates the same points here. Acceptance on the part of the City was shown in

Thiessen by the fact that the property had been annexed by the city of Lewiston; that it
was a street that extended from Main Street; that it was continuously, openly and
uninterruptedly traveled by the public as a highway for ten years prior to 1893; that most
of it was enclosed by a fence, telephone lines had been installed on it; and that since
annexation, the City maintained part of the street. Thiessen v. City of Lewiston, 26 Idaho
505,510, 144 P. 548, 549 (1914).
Moreover, in Thiessen, there was no question that the city of Lewiston had
accepted jurisdiction over the road, was regularly maintaining a portion of the road, and
was not disclaiming an interest in the road as is the case here. Thiessen is not a precedent
for this case.
The next case cited by the Highway District is Smylie v. Pearsall, 93 Idaho 188,
457 P.2d 427 (1969).

Like Boise City v. Hon, Smylie involved the platting of a

subdivision and the sale of lots with respect thereto, a factual distinction not applicable in
this case.
It is a settled principle that when a map or plat of a subdivided tract of
land is exhibited or recorded and conveyances are made of the lots by
reference thereto, the plat becomes a part of the deeds, and the plan shown
thereon is regarded as a unity. And, nothing else appearing, it is held that
all the streets, alleys, parks or other open spaces delineated on such map or
plat have been dedicated to the use of the purchasers of the lots and those

[7]

claiming under them as well as of the public. They become appurtenances
to the lots. It is presumed that all such places add value to all the lots
embraced in the general plan and that the purchasers invest their money
upon the faith of this assurance that such open spaces, particularly access
ways, are not to be the private property of the seller.

Id. 93 Idaho at 192.
The Highway District also tries to argue that Pugmire v. Johnson, 102 Idaho 882,
643 P.2d 832 (1982), supports its case.

However, Pugmire does not stand for the

proposition asserted by the Highway District. Pugmire involved the sale of lots under a
plat that had roads depicted on it and maintenance of at least some of the roads on the plat
by Bannock County for nine years. The maintenance included grading, weed control,
gravel surfacing, snow removal, plowing and sanding when necessary throughout the
year. The County also provided stop signs and street signs and the roads were open for
public use. Id. 102 Idaho at 882. The Court held that under the statutory provisions in
effect. the recording of the plat and maintenance of the roads by the County rendered the
roads public.

Id.

In addition, due to the sale of the platted lots, the Court found a

dedication. Finally, the Court held that once the County undertook jurisdiction, it could
not deny responsibility for such roads. Id.
The Highway District argues that the Pugmire Court's citation to Thiessen
supports it argument that simply public use alone can constitute acceptance of a
dedication. However, the Pugmire Court cited Thiessen as authority for these statements
by the Court:
The record clearly shows that at least some of the roads in question have
been used by the public for longer than five years and maintained at public
expense by the county from 1969 to 1978, a period of nine years.
Bannock County's regular maintenance and the extensive public use
disclosed in the record are sufficient to establish that roads which have

[8]

been so maintained and so used are county roads under LC. § § 40-103 and
-109.
Pugmire v. Johnson, 102 Idaho at 884.

Thiessen did involve long public use and

maintenance by the City of Lewiston. This citation is consistent with other citations to
Thiessen. For example, in John W. Brown Properties v. Blaine County, 129 Idaho 740,

932 P.2d 368 (Ct.App. 1997), the Idaho Court of Appeals cited Thiessen as authority for
the statement that "the terms 'establish' and 'dedicate' have both been used in Idaho case
law to describe the creation of a public roadway through public use and maintenance."
Id. 129 Idaho at 744.

The next case the Highway District attempts to rely on is Pullin v. Victor, 103
Idaho 879, 655 P.2d 86 (Ct.App. 1982). Pullin does not help the Highway District's
argument because the Court specifically reaffirmed the principle that "from the proof of
the sale between the parties, it may be inferred that the lots in Burrington' s Subdivision
were sold in reference to the plat of the subdivision. Such an inference could result in a
finding that the dedication of Birch Street had been accepted." Id. 103 Idaho at 882.
The only proposition that Thiessen is cited for is that an offer to dedicate may be oral.
Further, even where there was the sale of lots according to a plat, the Pullin Court
went to lengths to explain the necessity of acceptance by positive conduct whether
through maintenance or annexation or the assumption of jurisdiction over a road. The
Court stated that "official acceptance of a dedication may consist of any positive conduct
evincing consent of proper public officers on behalf of the public. [citation omitted] An
acceptance of a dedication of a street occurs when the city has done some act which
unequivocally shows an intent to assume jurisdiction over the property dedicated." Id
103 Idaho at 883.

[9]

The Pullin Court emphasized that the City had annexed the subdivision and
repealed an ordinance which had vacated one of the streets in the subdivision, clearly
showing an assumption of jurisdiction. The Court stated:
There is further evidence relating to the acceptance of the dedication of
Birch Street in the record before us. It is undisputed that the City of
Kimberly annexed Burrington's Subdivision in 1949, well before the
parties here entered into their transaction. The affidavit of Donald Taylor,
a former chairman of the Kimberly City Council, stated that in May, 1973,
the City Council formally repealed an ordinance which had vacated a
portion of Birch Street lying north of Lot 6 of Burrington's Subdivision.
That ordinance is not in the record. However, it can be inferred that the
city had accepted Birch Street as a public road either by the
annexation ordinance or by some other act, between 1949 and 1973;
otherwise, the city would have had no reason later to vacate part of
the street by ordinance. This inference gives rise to the further inference
that Birch Street may have been accepted as a public road as of 1961,
when Lot 6 was sold to the buyers herein.
Id. (Emphasis added).

The Highway District next relies on Worley Highway Dist. v Yacht Club of Coeur

d'Alene. Ltd., 116 Idaho 219, 775 P.2d 111 (1989).

However, Worley also involved the

platting and sale of lots with respect to the plat. Finding that a statutory dedication failed,
the Court reaffirmed the rule that "an offer to dedicate is accepted when lots are
purchased with reference to a filed plat." Id. 116 Idaho at 224.
Moreover, in contrast to the case at hand, in Worley, the Worley Highway District
claimed jurisdiction over the road and sought to quiet title in it. It was not a case, like
this one, where the Highway District and County are disclaiming jurisdiction.
The Highway District misrepresents the facts of Farrell v. Board of Com 'rs,

Lemhi County, 138 Idaho 378, 64 P.3d 304 (2002). First, the case expressly involved the
sale of lots in reference to a plat. The Court stated: "In this case the fact that a plat was
validly filed and patents sold referencing the plat and the road constitutes common law

[10]

dedication." Id. 138 Idaho at 385. As already shown, no such platting and sale of lots
occurred in this case.
Second, though not relied on for the ruling on common law dedication, the facts
show that in 1901, the Board of County Commissioners' resolved "that the dedication of
same [Indian Creek Road] be and the same is hereby accepted, and it is hereby ordered
that said above described road be added to and made a part of Road District No. 11 and
said road with plat as presented be recorded as provided by law." Id. 138 Idaho at 383.
Thus, long before the case at issue, Lemhi County had indicated an unequivocal intent to
assume jurisdiction over the road.
By the time of the case at issue, however, Lemhi County disavowed jurisdiction
and would not perform maintenance on it.

Due to the fact that the common law

dedication was completed through sale of lots in reference to the plat, the Court would
not release Lemhi County from its responsibility for the road, ruling that the road could
only be abandoned or vacated through the formal statutory process.
The last case cited by the Highway District is Lattin v. Adams County, 149 Idaho
497, 236 P.3d 1257 (2010). The Highway District mostly goes to lengths to distinguish
the case rather than rely on it presumably because of the following statement by the
Court:
The County also argues that a woman named Mrs. Stover orally dedicated
the road sometime between 1942 and 1974 when she owned the tract that
later became the Reico Subdivision. The County relies on an affidavit
from an area resident claiming that Mrs. Stover told the affiant she
intended for the road to remain open to the public. The County, however,
admitted that there is no evidence in the record that it had accepted
any dedication by Mrs. Stover. Even if there had been an acceptance,
this paraphrased statement attributed to an absent witness does not
unequivocally create a public dedication. There is no evidence that Mrs.
Stover stated her present intent to dedicate the road to the County, but

[ l l]

rather that she simply intended to allow the public to continue using the
road for recreation. Her statement, therefore, would not generate a genuine
fact issue as to dedication."
Id. 149 Idaho at 502. (Footnote omitted and emphasis added).

The Court made the statement that there was no acceptance of the purported
dedication by Adams County even in the face of extensive public use of the road. Thus,
the Court denied Adams County's argument for common law dedication by Mrs. Stover
on alternative bases, one of which was that Adams County had not accepted her offer to
dedicate. This confirms the requirement that there be some positive action by a county or
highway district accepting a common law dedication.
In Lattin. the Court ultimately held that the road became public by prescription, a
claim that the Highway District cannot prove in this case and has dropped.
Finally, even in a case where the federal government has offered to dedicate land
for highway purposes, the Idaho courts have held that such offer must be properly
accepted, either by public use and maintenance sufficient to establish a road by
prescription or "there must be some positive act or acts on the part of the proper public
authorities clearly manifesting an intention to accept such grant with respect to the
particular highway in question." French v. Sorensen, 113 Idaho 950, 957, 751 P.2d 98,
105 (1988), at fn. 4, (citing Kirk v. Schultz, 63 Idaho 278, 282-3, 119 P.2d 266, 268
(1941) and Roper v. Elkhorn at Sun Valley, 100 Idaho 790, 605 P.2d 968 (1980). Surely,
if these requirements must be shown for the acceptance of a federal offer to dedicate,
nothing less should be required of the dedication by a private party.
In this case, Paddison's Opening Brief shows that the facts m this case are
insufficient to show a road by prescription. This is confirmed by the Highway District's

[ 12]

relinquishment of that claim. Further, there has been no "positive act or acts on the part
of the proper public authorities clearly manifesting an intention to accept such grant with
respect to the particular highway in question."
In sum, though the Highway District and the County argue that Paddison is
arguing that common law dedication no longer exists, Paddison has not made this claim.
\Vhat Paddison does assert is that to prove a common law dedication in Idaho, the cases
require either the sale of lots in reference to a plat, or proof that the dedication was
accepted by positive conduct of proper public officers on behalf of the public or some act
which unequivocally shows intent to assume jurisdiction over the road.

This can be

shown by various acts on the part of proper public officials, including annexation, the
assumption of jurisdiction over and responsibility for the road, maintenance of the road,
or resolution. However, where there is no such sale of platted lots and where there is no
positive conduct or intent to assume jurisdiction, and, instead, there is an express
disavowal of any interest in the road, there is no acceptance.
C.

THE IDAHO STATUTES PRECLUDE THE RIGHT-OF-WAY FROM
BEING A PUBLIC RIGHT-OF-WAY UNDER THE LAWS OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO.
1. The Highway District's and County's position that the right-of-way is a
public right-of-way under the laws of the state of Idaho is inconsistent
with its failure to assume jurisdiction over or assert an interest in the
right-of-way.

LC.§ 40-1310 sets out the authority of the highway district. 3 Subsection (8) and
(9) state:

(8) The highway district board of commissioners shall have the exclusive
general supervisory authority over all public highways, public streets and
public rights-of-way under their jurisdiction, with full power to establish
design standards, establish use standards, pass resolutions and establish
3

The statutes relating to county authority are virtually identical.

[ 13]

regulations in accordance with the provisions of title 49, Idaho Code, and
control access to said public highways, public streets and public rights-ofway.
(9) By July 1, 2000, and every five (5) years thereafter, the highway
district board of commissioners shall have published in map form and
made readily available the location of all public rights-of-way under its
jurisdiction. Any highway district board of commissioners may be granted
an extension of time with the approval of the legislature by adoption of a
concurrent resolution.

If the right-of-way here were in fact a public road under the laws of the state of
Idaho, the Highway District (or the County) would be required to assume jurisdiction
over it, regulate it, and include it as a public right-of-way on its map. Neither the County
nor the Highway District did any of this and instead specifically disavow responsibility
for or jurisdiction over the road.
Both the Highway District and County rely on l.C. § 40-202 for the argument that
they do not have to maintain a public right-of-way for it to be a public right-of-way.
Paddison does not dispute the proposition that upon a dedication, a county or highway
district is not required to immediately begin maintaining the road. However, the County
and the Highway District carefully avoid mentioning the entire statute because a full
reading of the statute refutes their argument that no action on the part of public officials is
required for acceptance of a dedication and mere use alone can constitute acceptance.
Consistent with LC. § 40-1310(8) and (9) set out above, LC. § 40-202(2) requires
that on a dedication, a county or highway district must take some action, even if by
simple resolution, to assume jurisdiction over the road. It provides:
(2) If a county or highway district acquires an interest in real property for
highway or public right-of-way purposes, the respective commissioners
shall:
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(a) Cause any order or resolution enacted, and deed or other document
establishing an interest in the property for their highway system purposes
to be recorded in the county records; or
(b) Cause the official map of the county or highway district system to be
amended as affected by the acceptance of the highway or public right-ofway.
Provided, however, a county with highway jurisdiction or highway district
may hold title to an interest in real property for public right-of-way
purposes without incurring an obligation to construct or maintain a
highway within the right-of-way until the county or highway district
determines that the necessities of public travel justify opening a highway
within the right-of-way. The lack of an opening shall not constitute an
abandonment, and mere use by the public shall not constitute an opening
of the public right-of-way.
Here, the Highway District and the County have specifically disavowed an
interest in or jurisdiction over the right-of-way; neither has resolved to include the rightof-way in its highway system; and neither includes it on its official map. If anything, this
section confirms that either the County of Highway District must take some sort of
positive action to accept a dedication of a road for it to be a public road under the laws of
the state of Idaho.

2. The right-of-way here is excluded from qualifying as a public road
because it is under federal control.
In Pugmire v. Johnson, 102 Idaho 882, 643 P.2d 832 (1982), the Court held that
where public use and maintenance results in a road being a "public highway," it is part of
the ··county road system" or "highway district system" as the case may be. Id. 102 Idaho
at 884.

Yet, the statutory definitions for a "highway district system" and a "county

highway system" exclude public highways under federal control.

Idaho Code § 40-

109(1) excludes public highways under federal control from the Highway District System
and LC. § 40-104(6) excludes public highways under federal control from the County
Highway System.
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Likewise, in French v. Sorensen, 113 Idaho 950, 751 P.2d 98 (1988), Custer
County attempted to argue, based on an earlier Idaho case, that a road under the control
of the Forest Service and in which the Forest Service had an easement was a public road
under the laws of the state of Idaho. In distinguishing the case and rejecting the argument
the Supreme Court quoted from and upheld the opinion of the district court which stated:
The road in Nesbitt was not a road under control of the Forest Service as
in the case at bar. There was no need for the majority to address, as did
Justice Smith in dissent, J.C.§ 40-109(b). The genesis ofl.C. § 40-109(b)
was Session Laws 1951, ch. 93, sec. 4,p. 165. The chapter extensively
created a highway and road system for state, county, municipal and road
districts. Then LC. 40-109(b) stated:
·'A 'county road system' shall comprise all public highways in a county
except those included within highway system, those included within
municipal street systems of incorporated cities and villages, and those
underfederal control."
The present statute is substantially the same, LC. 40-104(6). "The court is
of the opinion the foregoing statutes disclose that counties have no duties
relative to Forest Service roads, nor rights to declare them county roads
under J.C. 40-202."
Therefore. a public highway cannot be established by public use if it is under
federal control. Otherwise, by accepting the Highway District's arguments, there would
exist in the State of Idaho a "public" roadway where no particular political subdivision
claims jurisdiction.
As already mentioned, the District has admitted that the Coolwater Ridge Road,
including the right-of-way, is claimed by the federal government.

Therefore, being

under purported federal control, the right-of-way cannot qualify as a public highway
through public use.
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D.

THE HIGHWAY DISTRICT HAS JURISDICTION OVER THE SEL\VAY
RIVER ROAD; ITS STATUS HAS NEVER BEEN AT ISSUE IN THIS
CASE; AND PADDISION HAS ALWAYS AGREED THAT IT IS A
PUBLIC ROAD UNDER THE LAWS OF THE STATE OF IDAHO.
As for the general statements by the Highway District and County in their Briefs

as to the Selway River Road, Paddison has made it crystal clear: Paddison does not
challenge the status of the Selway River Road as a public road under the laws of the state
of Idaho. It is not and has never been a part of this case.
Contrary to the right-of-way in this case, the Highway District does accept and
exercise jurisdiction over the Selway River Road. Paddison's Complaint raises no issues
with respect to the Selway River Road nor even mentions it. Paddison has not challenged
the jurisdiction of the Highway District over the Selway River Road and Paddison has
always agreed that the Selway River Road is a public road under the laws of the state of
Idaho. In fact, it was the Paddison family that granted an easement to the public for use
of the Selway Road to cross their property. (R., 130).
The fact that the Highway District and County continue to even brings this issue
up 1s nothing more than an attempt to continue stoking fear that somehow this case
implicates that road. The Highway District and County's repeated reference to this issue
is made solely to inflame passions and such tactic should not be condoned by the Court.

E.

NEITHER THE HIGHWAY DISTRICT NOR COUNTY IS ENTITLED TO
ATTORNEY'S FEES OR COSTS.
The County did not seek attorney's fees in its brief and, therefore, is foreclosed

from claiming attorney's fees and costs. I.AR. 40 and 41.
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The Highway District seeks attorney's fees and costs under LC. § 12-117 and
I.A.R. 40 and 41. The Highway District is not entitled to attorney's fees or costs because

this case was not pursed unreasonably or without a foundation.
The issue in this case is whether a common law dedication can be accepted by
mere public use, without a public agency expressly accepting the dedication. There are
no cases that support the proposition that mere public use alone constitutes acceptance of
a dedication.

The recent case law on dedication clearly states that there must be an

acceptance of the dedication by the relevant public agency. See e.g., Pullin v. Victor, 103
Idaho 879, 881, 655 P.2d 86. 88 (Ct.App. 1982.) "Generally, official acceptance of a
dedication may consist of any positive conduct evincing consent of proper public officers
on behalf of the public." Id.
In addition, cases involving issues of first impression should not appropriate for
an award of fees under LC. § Section 12-117. See e.g., PurCo. Fleet Services v. Idaho

State Dept. of Finance, l...J.0 Idaho 121, 90 P.3d 346 (2004); Ticor Title Co. v. Stanion,
144 Idaho 119,157 P.3d 613 (2007).
In this case, it cannot be said that this case was brought unreasonably and without
foundation. Alternatively, even if the Court rules in favor of Defendants, it would be one
of first impression about whether mere public use, without official acceptance by a state
public agency, can create a public road under a common law dedication theory.
Therefore, the Court should deny the Highway District' claim for attorney's fees and
costs.

r1s1

IV.

CONCLUSION

For all of the reasons set fot1h in Paddison's Opening Brief and those set forth
above, Paddison requests summary judgment that the dedication of the right-of-way "to
the general public for all road and highway purposes provided for in the laws of the State
of Idaho" was not complete and that the right-of-way identified in the deeds is not a
public road and/or highway established or provided for under the laws of the State of
Idaho.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this

day of May, 2011.

HAEMMERLE & HAEMMERLE, P.L.L.C.
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h__

day of May, 2011, I served a true and correct
I hereby certify that on the
copy of the within and foregoing document upon the attomey(s) named below in the
manner noted:
Kirk A. MacGregor
Idaho County Prosecuting Attorney
P.O. 463
Grangeville, ID 83530
SHERER & WYNKOOP, LLP
David E. Wynkoop
730 N. Main St.
P.O. Box 31
Meridian, ID 83680
X

By depositing copies of the same in the United States Mail, postage prepaid,
at the post office at Hailey, Idaho.
By hand delivering copies of the same to the office of the attomey(s) at his
offices in Hailey, Idaho.
By telecopying copies of same to said attomey(s) at the telecopier number
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ , and by then mailing copies of the same in the United
States Mail, postage prepaid, at the post office at Hailey, Idaho.

PRITZ X. HAEMMERLE ~ - - - - - - -
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